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Changes in the Main EU Policy Tools on 
Farm Investment Behaviour 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper completes the comparative analysis of the investment demand behaviour, of a sample of 
specialised arable crop farms, for farm buildings and machinery and equipment, as a function of the 
different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support, in selected European Union Member 
States. This contribution focuses on their quantitative interdependence calculating the relevant 
elasticity measures. In turn, they constitute the methodological tool to simulate the percentage 
expected change in average net investment levels associated to the implementation of the, recently 
proposed and currently under discussion, reductions in the Pillar I Direct Payments disbursed under 
the Common Agricultural Policy. Evidence suggests a statistically significant elastic and inelastic 
relationship between both types of subsidies and the investment levels for both asset classes in 
Germany and Italy, respectively. An elastic dependence of investment in farm buildings on decoupled 
subsidies exists in Hungary while changes in the level of coupled payments appear to translate into 
less than proportional changes in the demand for both farm buildings and machinery and equipment 
in France. Coupled payments appear to influence the UK demand for both asset classes in an elastic 
manner while decoupled support seems to induce a similar effect on investment in machinery and 
equipment. Since the currently discussed Common Agricultural Policy reform options imply, almost 
exclusively, a reduction in the level of support granted through Direct Payments, simulated effects 
were expected to reveal a worsening of the farm investment prospects for both asset types (i.e., a larger 
negative investment or a smaller positive one). The actual evidence largely respects this expectation 
with the sole exception of investment in machinery and equipment in France and Italy reaching 
smaller negative or larger positive levels irrespectively of the magnitude of the implemented cuts in 
Direct Payments. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2005 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), characterised by the phasing in 
of support tools decoupled from production choices, was intended to support farmers’ 
income with a Single Farm Payment (SFP) reducing the distortionary effects of price support 
implemented for many years, that heavily affected output choices by farmers, as well as by 
coupled payments, linked to land allocations to the different crops. Deliverable D5.2 has 
tackled the estimation of the role of both coupled and decoupled subsidies on investment 
choices, in farm buildings (FB) and machinery and equipment (ME), of a sample of farms 
specialised in field crops in selected European Union (EU) countries. The contribution 
mainly focused on the specification of a model able to account for irregularities in the cost 
adjustment function as well as to characterise the existence of a zero investment regime as a 
farm’s optimal choice in presence of credit constraints (Sckokai, 2005), differences in the 
assets’ purchase and resale prices (Johnson, 1956), asset fixity and real option (Huttel et al., 
2010). 
The present Deliverable builds on the estimates in Deliverable D5.2 focusing on evaluating 
the quantitative evidence associated with the most frequent farms’ attitude – among 
disinvestment (Dis), zero investment (ZInv) and investment (Inv) – toward the adjustment of 
capital stocks in the countries for which the investment models have been estimated 
(Hansen, 1999). Moreover, it provides an in depth analysis of the dependence of investment 
levels on support ones, studying the regime and year specific elasticities of capital adjustment 
to both types of support. Moreover, since the current debate on CAP reform after 2013 
proposes significant changes of the average level of Direct Payments (DPs) disbursed to 
farmers in different countries, in order to achieve a redistribution of support levels among 
EU Member States, it is interesting to evaluate the expected consequences of the debated 
reform scenarios on farm investment in the countries of interest. This is achieved carrying 
out a comparative static analysis of the percentage changes in investment levels calculated 
applying the regime-dependent elasticies calculated for 2008 and the percentage changes in 
DPs occurring under the different implementation scenarios (EC, 2011). 
The remainder of the Deliverable provides, in section 2, a description of the policy scenarios 
of interest, in section 3 presents the Empirical Model; section 4 summarises the data at hand 
while section 5 presents and discusses the simulation results. The last section offers some 
concluding remarks. 
2. CAP policy reform scenarios 
The CAP towards 2020 policy reform proposal is built upon three main drivers: the 
Adjustment, the Integration and the Refocus scenarios for DPs disbursement levels (EC, 
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2011). In turn, the Adjustment scenario comprises three different implementations: the EU 
flat rate, the Min 80% and the Min 90% and objective criteria. The EU flat rate envisages an 
EU-wide flat rate payment per hectare of potential eligible area (PEA). Although the Min 
80% scenario is inherently a policy scheme disbursing a flat rate payment, it is implemented 
to equalise the average level of DPs in Member States (MSs) to at least 80% of the current EU 
average. In the Min 90% and objective criteria implementation the minimum payment 
reaches 90% of the EU average, while additional environmental and economic criteria are 
spelled out to address the financing of the extra 10% disbursed under this, compared to the 
previous, policy scenario. The European Commission (EC) proposal for reforming the DPs 
allocation among MSs in the Integration scenario implies that MSs receiving less than 90% 
of the EU-27 average DPs will experience, over the Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2014-
2020, a reduction in their gap – from the EU average – by a third. Lastly, the Refocus 
scenario implies a radical shift in the CAP support policies, since DPs are scrapped altogether 
while the funds allocated to Pillar-II measures are doubled. Note that we are unable to 
simulate the changes in investment patterns due to the implementation of the policies under 
the Refocus scenario since we have not included Pillar-II measures among the determinants 
of farms’ investment demands. The level of DPs associated to each policy scenario is 
evaluated in EC (2011) with respect to a 2020 status quo scenario implying a full phasing-in 
(i.e., 100%) of DPs in the EU-12 paid to both small and large farms. Moreover, the percentage 
changes in DPs are determined as if a regional model at the MS level was applied and 
accounting for some limited provision of coupled payments (mainly for livestock production 
and cotton). Table 1 presents the percentage change in DPs in the countries of interest under 
the different policy scenarios. 
Table 1. Percentage change in DPs under different CAP Policy Reform Scenarios 
 
EU Flat Rate 
(1) 
Min 80% 
(2) 
Min 90% and objective criteria 
(3) 
Integration 
(4) 
FR -17 -12 -13 -2 
DEU -23 -13 -16 -4 
HUN -10 -7 -8 0 
ITA -37 -10 -22 -6 
UK 6 -10 -5 -2 
Source: authors’ compilation based on EC (2011). 
3. Empirical Model 
The methodological approach to the yearly classification of farms in the estimated regimes 
relies on the original procedure coded by Hansen (1999). 
Employing the estimated betas for coupsub and decsub estimated in Deliverable 5.25, and 
presented in column 1 of Tables 2 and 3, and the yearly and regime specific averages for sub 
and Inv, presented in the subsequent columns, we calculate the regime-specific yearly 
elasticities of investment to the relevant CAP support as: 
 ߦ௜,௝
௦௨௕ ൌ ߚ௦௨௕ כ
௦௨௕ഢ,ണതതതതതതതത
ప௡௩ഢ,ണതതതതതതതത
  (1) 
where ߚ௦௨௕ ൌ
డூ௡௩೔,ೕ
డ௦௨௕തതതതത೔
, with sub=c,d for coupled and decoupled support before and after 2005, 
respectively, is the beta coefficient for every investment demand equation estimated in 
Deliverable 5.2. Since subscripts i and j identify the year and the regime, ݏݑܾప,ఫതതതതതതത and ଓ݊ݒప,ఫതതതതതതത 
represent the yearly and regime-specific average value of subsidies received under the 
relevant support policy and of net investment levels in each asset class. Note that while the 
capital stock in the previous period (K-1) was allowed to have regime-specific behaviours, 
IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE MAIN EU POLICY TOOLS ON FARM INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR | 3 
 
such that the related investment levels (inv) can be thought to be genuinely regime-specific, 
the average value of subsidies is regime specific through the number of farms which belong to 
the identified regime (i.e., the estimated beta for each type of subsidies is unique). HUN is 
the only country for which two sets of elasticities can be calculated, since this is the only 
country which benefitted from both types of support in 2005-08. Given ߚ௦௨௕ is the only 
stochastic element in (1), the statistical significance of ߦ௜,௝
௦௨௕  is due to the statistical 
significance of the related ߚ௦௨௕. 
Comparative static analyses of the percentage effects of the implementation of the policy 
scenarios presented in Table 1 is carried out as in (2): 
 ∆ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത ൌ ߦଶ଴଴଼,௝
௦௨௕ כ ∆݀௦  (2) 
where ∆ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത is the percentage change variation in average net investment levels in the asset 
class of interest in regime j to be used for comparative static analyses; ߦଶ଴଴଼,௝
௦௨௕  is the most 
recent, regime-specific, elasticity which appears suitable to simulate the expected variations 
in investment levels while ∆݀௦ is the percentage change in DPs presented in Table 1 where the 
subscript s=1,…4 denotes the columns’ identifiers. 
4. Data 
This paper simulates percentage changes in average net investment levels of a sample of 
specialised arable crop farms drawn from those subject, every year, to the survey each MS 
carries out – on behalf of the EC – as part of the FADN initiative intended to collect relevant 
economic information from agricultural holdings in the EU. Specialised arable crop farms are 
those classified, according to their main output, as “specialist cereals, oilseeds and protein 
crops (COP)”, “general field cropping” and “mixed cropping” (TF8=13 or TF8=14 or 
TF8=60). Table 2 and 3 present a summary of the variables relevant to this exercise. The 
interested reader is referred to the same section of Deliverable 5.2 where data construction is 
described in a very detailed manner. Due to the consequential link existing between the 
present Deliverable and Deliverable 5.2, we are able to calculate the simulated percentage 
changes in regime-specific average net investment for France (FR), Germany (DEU), 
Hungary (HUN), Italy (IT) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
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Table 2. Estimated beta and average values of the investment levels and coupled support 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 
  Regimes ࢼࢉ ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത 
FR 
FB 
Dis 
-4.3330 -85.8388 2.7309 -42.2751 2.6143 45.1803 2.8233 -17.2545 2.8637 
ZInv 
Inv -4.3330 -0.9388 1.7797 46.4072 1.7019 -34.6451 1.9007 100.0143 3.0251 
ME 
Dis 54.4573 -480.4792 1.5422 -160.9772 1.6732 -357.0226 1.5216 -175.7271 1.6657 
ZInv 54.4573 -300.7790 1.5882 -32.8439 1.5329 -109.7984 1.6513 37.5810 1.5352 
Inv 54.4573 -290.4564 1.1437 -83.1586 1.1260 -341.6830 1.8532 98.1631 1.2264 
DEU 
FB 
Dis 595.9798*** 165.1218 9.4084 576.8825 8.7541 -90.5728 8.7105 -10.7442 8.8358 
ZInv 595.9798*** 511.8539 8.6272 -1220.5550 7.5304 -1179.3850 6.2993 -199.6953 9.9075 
Inv 595.9798*** -1.8108 3.0070 360.5040 1.9171 25.5168 1.8708 521.4499 3.2597 
ME 
Dis 541.5990*** -282.8019 2.4319 -510.5523 2.8352 -482.4994 2.7536 -285.3839 3.1599 
ZInv 541.5990*** -442.8172 3.3141 -403.0906 2.5913 -256.6002 2.5714 39.0497 2.6652 
Inv 541.5990*** -75.3888 1.0725 -207.6631 1.5082 21.9524 1.2842 -240.2413 1.6082 
IT 
FB 
Dis -32.3735*** -232.4673 3.7006 -280.9582 6.0218 -173.2511 3.2082 -240.4110 8.9763 
ZInv 
-32.3735*** -254.9004 2.7696 -275.1392 2.0567 -375.2426 3.4175 -249.3320 2.9351 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 146.9623† -500.6398 1.8659 -388.3957 1.6419 -420.0337 2.3178 -330.7886 2.0897 
ZInv 
146.9623† -246.7776 0.6341 -385.3715 0.6230 -316.4096 1.1263 -327.7776 0.9469 
Inv 
UK 
FB 
Dis 199.3998** 39.3872 3.7197 -230.4640 3.6308 -208.2371 4.0420 -129.5489 2.8296 
ZInv 
199.3998** 225.1431 3.8789 -122.4917 3.1095 -152.4852 2.8910 -309.8737 2.5075 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 
320.4714 -201.6851 3.1535 -401.9202 2.8446 -566.6652 3.2503 -409.3267 2.7014 ZInv 
Inv 
Notes: ܫ݊ݒതതതതത measured in real Euros, ܿ݋ݑ݌ݏݑܾതതതതതതതതതതത expressed in 1,000 real Euros, *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level 
based on two tailed tests; † denotes significant at 15%; values for the UK are for the period 1997 – 2001 due to data limitations. 
Source: authors’ estimates from Deliverable 5.2 and calculations based on EU-FADN - DG AGRI data. 
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Table 3. Estimated betas and average values of the investment levels and CAP support 
     2005 2006 2007 2008 
   
ࢼࢉ ࢼࢊ ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത ࢊࢋࢉ࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതത ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത ࢊࢋࢉ࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതത ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത ࢊࢋࢉ࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതത ࡵ࢔࢜തതതതത ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതതതത ࢊࢋࢉ࢙࢛࢈തതതതതതതതതതത 
FR 
FB 
Dis § 
51.2279* -68.0199 § 0.0103 -97.2210 § 2.3081 -142.5983 § 2.1750 -3.9044 § 2.4681 
ZInv § 
Inv § 51.2279* -137.5089 § 0.0080 434.9408 § 1.3461 -289.1418 § 2.5957 -129.1957 § 1.9726 
ME 
Dis § -121.6025† -173.9966 § 0.0057 -338.3541 § 1.1848 -221.5117 § 1.0925 -229.9723 § 0.8858 
ZInv § -121.6025† 6.6026 § 0.0056 -149.6155 § 1.3755 52.0708 § 1.3440 73.8329 § 1.2264 
Inv § -121.6025† 179.6021 § 0.0053 -155.7135 § 0.8318 34.0780 § 0.8439 232.8085 § 0.9644 
DEU 
FB 
Dis § 435.5835*** -369.1033 § 7.4358 -390.3945 § 7.2177 449.4405 § 7.9690 3500.7560 § 7.4631 
ZInv § 435.5835*** -370.9423 § 6.0595 178.5169 § 5.6156 213.2981 § 5.7941 510.9320 § 7.8235 
Inv § 435.5835*** -141.7203 § 2.5951 1557.5980 § 2.7397 2510.9070 § 3.3581 1320.0380 § 5.9821 
ME 
Dis § 622.7084** -322.5650 § 2.3359 33.7894 § 2.1157 -46.5602 § 2.2857 -232.6132 § 2.6059 
ZInv § 622.7084** -66.0053 § 1.2836 -40.0645 § 1.5594 181.3366 § 1.4377 319.2914 § 2.4877 
Inv § 622.7084** 43.4546 § 0.8175 195.0587 § 0.8812 533.5139 § 1.0484 -9.6516 § 1.5453 
HUN 
FB 
Dis 341.4439 673.5537*** 779.5925 1.3221 1.0444 -314.6286 0.8422 1.7098 -322.1168 1.7694 2.8897 -332.7315 0.5206 1.9626 
ZInv 341.4439 673.5537*** 1994.1780 1.6970 1.7240 4.1907 1.5565 2.7868 371.0842 2.5918 5.7904 -33.5046 0.1598 3.9170 
Inv 341.4439 673.5537*** 1250.5670 1.7104 1.5048 -30.0638 1.1400 1.3215 112.4543 1.7824 3.4396 470.7855 0.2139 2.8659 
ME 
Dis 374.3918† 274.1298 -4.4098 0.4589 0.3582 61.9654 0.2606 0.5251 180.9316 0.4187 0.7248 332.2688 0.2543 0.6496 
ZInv 374.3918† 274.1298 -412.4267 0.6660 0.6751 -284.6523 0.5007 0.8897 82.9343 0.5403 1.2089 -202.1463 0.0461 1.2831 
Inv 374.3918† 274.1298 224.1603 0.5455 0.4921 -297.1134 0.4223 0.5804 374.0162 0.4025 0.7359 -99.5305 0.0641 0.8210 
ITA 
FB 
Dis § 21.8279 -203.9176 § 2.0198 399.4837 § 2.5169 -317.8424 § 2.6564 -366.8578 § 2.3278 
ZInv § 21.8279 139.7718 § 2.7742 95.7715 § 3.5908 -332.1156 § 2.9296 -365.0720 § 3.1328 
Inv § 21.8279 393.0961 § 2.2120 342.7694 § 2.5312 -237.0799 § 2.8713 -550.8514 § 2.8969 
ME 
Dis § 
-12.7120† -328.4479 § 0.9417 -395.5967 § 1.1571 -333.5289 § 1.2129 -374.5699 § 1.1454 ZInv § 
Inv § 
UK 
FB 
Dis § 49.1979 127.9110 § 2.8224 409.9789 § 3.2890 82.3340 § 1.8955 -327.1312 § 2.4714 
ZInv § 
49.1979 -179.5111 § 3.0260 -16.1941 § 3.0593 169.8991 § 2.5671 44.6537 § 3.1493 
Inv § 
ME 
Dis § 
687.1385* -36.3025 § 2.9841 118.3018 § 2.7465 435.7149 § 2.4230 428.3541 § 2.6680 ZInv § 
Inv § 
Notes: ܫ݊ݒതതതതത measured in real Euros, ܿ݋ݑ݌ݏݑܾതതതതതതതതതതത and ݀݁ܿݏݑܾതതതതതതതതതത expressed in 1,000 real Euros *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level based on two 
tailed tests; † denotes significant at 15%; § denotes Not Applicable. 
Source: authors’ estimates from Deliverable 5.2 and calculations based on EU-FADN - DG AGRI data. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Classification into regimes 
Following Hansen (1999), and differently from Serra et al. (2009), in Table 4 and 5 we 
provide a classification of the number of farms which belong to each of the highlighted 
regimes (if any) every year we have data for. This allows for recognising any change, over 
time and/or asset class in the most relevant attitude towards investment in the countries of 
interest. 
Table 4. Farm classification into estimated regimes 2001 - 2004 
  Regimes #farms 2001 #farms 2002 #farms 2003 #farms 2004 
FR 
FB 
Dis 
339 357 356 338 
ZInv 
Inv 70 52 53 71 
ME 
Dis 88 140 109 120 
ZInv 224 188 220 198 
Inv 97 81 80 91 
DEU 
FB 
Dis 152 159 186 145 
ZInv 76 78 67 74 
Inv 67 58 42 76 
ME 
Dis 71 65 106 76 
ZInv 120 119 103 103 
Inv 104 111 86 116 
IT 
FB 
Dis 13 12 11 6 
ZInv 
57 58 59 64 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 36 37 24 34 
ZInv 
34 33 46 36 
Inv 
UK 
FB 
Dis 24 61 62 65 
ZInv 
77 40 39 36 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 
101 101 101 101 ZInv 
Inv 
Notes: 1997-2001 period for the UK due to data limitations. 
Source: authors’ estimates based on results and EU-FADN - DG AGRI data from Deliverable 5.2. 
 
Table 5. Farm classification under estimated regimes 2005- 2008 
  
 #farms 2005 #farms 2006 #farms 2007 #farms 2008 
FR 
FB 
Dis 
313 316 308 249 
ZInv 
Inv 37 34 42 101 
ME 
Dis 128 146 120 35 
ZInv 144 139 150 153 
Inv 78 65 80 162 
DEU 
FB 
Dis 56 87 57 27 
ZInv 185 175 188 166 
Inv 62 41 58 110 
ME 
Dis 144 163 141 72 
ZInv 116 110 127 154 
Inv 43 30 35 77 
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HUN 
FB 
Dis 36 44 42 37 
ZInv 114 118 51 71 
Inv 57 45 114 99 
ME 
Dis 35 41 45 36 
ZInv 97 113 78 73 
Inv 75 53 84 98 
ITA 
FB 
Dis 216 212 227 80 
ZInv 167 184 207 194 
Inv 187 174 136 296 
ME 
Dis 
570 570 570 570 ZInv 
Inv 
UK 
FB 
Dis 27 20 16 5 
ZInv 
69 76 80 91 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 
96 96 96 96 ZInv 
Inv 
Source: authors’ estimates based on results and EU-FADN - DG AGRI data from Deliverable 5.2. 
Over the years coupled support was in place, farms in FR appear to be consistently 
Disinvestment (Dis) and Zero Investment (ZInv) (the two behaviours being indistinguishable 
between themselves) in FB while – once again consistently – ZInv in ME.1 Note that in 2002 
and 2004 the number of farms in the Dis regime render the latter the second most relevant 
type of investment behaviour characterising this asset class. In DEU the majority of farms 
appear to be Dis FB over the whole period of coupled support while have ZInv in ME until 
2002 with the following years experiencing fluctuations in the most relevant regime. The 
indistinguishable regimes ZInv and Inv are the ones describing, persistently, the attitude of 
IT farms towards a change in the quantity of FB. Over the years, the only persistent changes 
in the number of farms belonging to each regime occur for the ME and FB asset classes in IT 
and the UK, respectively. In the former country, the predominant Dis behaviour turns into 
the combined ZInv and Investment (Inv) one. Note that a significant difference between the 
number of farms belonging to either regimes arises only in the year 2003. In the latter 
country, the prevalence of farms in the combined regime ZInv Inv in 1997 evolves in the 
concentration of farms into the Dis regime since 1998. 
Over the years characterised by decoupled support, the consistent predominance of the Dis 
and ZInv (indistinguishable) behaviours, which characterised the period of coupled support, 
is still verified in FR for FB. The only perceivable change occurs in 2008 when a large 
increase, from the previous year, in the number of farms Inv is recorded. On the contrary, 
each of the three different investment behaviours is the most relevant, over the period 2005-
2008, for ME investment in FR. Note that the ZInv one occurs twice in those years. Following 
the move toward DPs, the investment in FB in DEU seems to have increased since the regime 
consistently absorbing the largest number of farms is ZInv, rather than Dis. Note that 2008 
suggests a further move towards higher investment levels given the Inv regime has doubled, 
from the previous year, the number of farms included and the gap with the ZInv has 
decreased substantially. The model for ME investment in DEU turns from being 
characterised by a large number of farms Dis to a significant number of farms ZInv in 2008, 
somewhat confirming an improvement in investment dynamics. A similar phenomenon 
characterises HUN which turns from ZInv in both FB and ME until 2006 to Inv then on, 
                                                        
1 Abel and Eberly (1994) remark that in presence of a single root of the function maximizing, choosing 
investment, the value of discounted value of the firm, “…the range of inaction is degenerate” (Abel and 
Eberly, 1994:1375). Whenever two regimes are identified and although we report the conflation of the 
two indistinguishable regimes, the reader should intend the estimated regimes as Dis and Inv only. 
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although the second most relevant regime is now at a closer distance. IT seems to have 
already endured some adaptation towards lower levels of FB investment since the most 
populated regime – between 2004 and 2007 – is the Dis one while a resurgence of Inv occurs 
in 2008. Probably the most marked effect of the change in CAP support materialises for 
investment in FB in the UK. In fact, while Dis had prevailed – over a combined ZInv Inv 
regime – since 1998, the latter has return to consistently include the majority of UK farms 
investing in FB. 
5.2 Elasticities calculations 
Table 6 and 7 present the elasticities of investment to agricultural support at the yearly and 
regime-specific means of the relevant variables obtained by equation (1). 
Table 6. Elasticity of average net investment to average coupled subsidies (2001-2004) 
   
ࣈ૛૙૙૚,࢐
ࢉ  ࣈ૛૙૙૛,࢐
ࢉ  ࣈ૛૙૙૜,࢐
ࢉ  ࣈ૛૙૙૝,࢐
ࢉ  
FR 
FB 
Dis 
0.1379 0.2680 -0.2708 0.7191 
ZInv 
Inv 8.2141 -0.1589 0.2377 -0.1311 
ME 
Dis -0.1748 -0.5660 -0.2321 -0.5162 
ZInv -0.2876 -2.5416 -0.8190 2.2246 
Inv -0.2144 -0.7374 -0.2954 0.6804 
DEU 
FB 
Dis 33.9581*** 9.0439*** -57.3161*** -490.1210*** 
ZInv 10.0451*** -3.6770*** -3.1832*** -29.5684*** 
Inv -989.6793*** 3.1693*** 43.6951*** 3.7256*** 
ME 
Dis -4.6574*** -3.0076*** -3.0909*** -5.9968*** 
ZInv -4.0534*** -3.4817*** -5.4274*** 36.9649*** 
Inv -7.7049*** -3.9335*** 31.6832*** -3.6255*** 
IT 
FB 
Dis 0.5153*** 0.6939*** 0.5995*** 1.2087*** 
ZInv 
0.3518*** 0.2420*** 0.2948*** 0.3811*** 
Inv 
ME 
Dis -0.5477 -0.6213 -0.8110 -0.9284 
ZInv 
-0.3776 -0.2376 -0.5231 -0.4246 
Inv 
UK 
FB 
Dis 18.8312*** -3.1414*** -3.8705*** -4.3553*** 
ZInv 
3.4354*** -5.0618*** -3.7805*** -1.6135*** 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 
-5.0108 -2.2681 -1.8382 -2.1150 ZInv 
Inv 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level based on two tailed 
tests; values for the UK are for the period 1997 – 2001 due to data limitations. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Table. 
Table 7. Elasticity of investment to decoupled subsidies (2005-2008) 
   
ࣈ૛૙૙૞,࢐
ࢉ  ࣈ૛૙૙૞,࢐
ࢊ  ࣈ૛૙૙૟,࢐
ࢉ  ࣈ૛૙૙૟,࢐
ࢊ  ࣈ૛૙૙ૠ,࢐
ࢉ  ࣈ૛૙૙ૠ,࢐
ࢊ  ࣈ૛૙૙ૡ,࢐
ࢉ  ࣈ૛૙૙ૡ,࢐
ࢊ  
FR 
FB 
Dis 
§ -0.0078* § -1.2162* § -0.7814* § -32.3828* 
ZInv 
Inv § -0.0030* § 0.1585* § -0.4599* § -0.7822* 
ME 
Dis § 0.0040 § 0.4258 § 0.5997 § 0.4684 
ZInv § -0.1031 § 1.1180 § -3.1387 § -2.0199 
Inv § -0.0036 § 0.6495 § -3.0113 § -0.5037 
DEU FB 
Dis § -8.7751*** § -8.0532*** § 7.7233*** § 0.9286*** 
ZInv § -7.1154*** § 13.7021*** § 11.8323*** § 6.6697*** 
Inv § -7.9762*** § 0.7662*** § 0.5826*** § 1.9740*** 
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ME 
Dis 
§ -4.5094** § 38.9905** § -
30.5696** 
§ -6.9760** 
ZInv § -12.1098** § -24.2372** § 4.9371** § 4.8517** 
Inv § 11.7148** § 2.8132** § 1.2237** § -99.7007** 
HUN 
FB 
Dis 0.5790 0.9023*** -0.9140 -3.6603*** -1.8755 -6.0424*** -0.5342 -3.9729*** 
ZInv 0.2906 0.5823*** 126.8183 447.9107*** 2.3848 10.5101*** -1.6286 -78.7439*** 
Inv 0.4670 0.8105*** -12.9473 -29.6071*** 5.4119 20.6017*** 0.1551 4.1002*** 
ME 
Dis -38.9606 -22.2671 1.5745 2.3230 0.8664 1.0981 0.2865 0.5359 
ZInv -0.6046 -0.4487 -0.6586 -0.8568 2.4391 3.9959 -0.0854 -1.7400 
Inv 0.9111 0.6018 -0.5321 -0.5355 0.4029 0.5394 -0.2411 -2.2612 
ITA 
FB 
Dis § -0.2162 § 0.1375 § -0.1824 § -0.1385 
ZInv § 0.4332 § 0.8184 § -0.1925 § -0.1873 
Inv § 0.1228 § 0.1612 § -0.2644 § -0.1148 
ME 
Dis 
§ 0.0364 § 0.0372 § 0.0462 § 0.0389 ZInv 
Inv 
UK 
FB 
Dis § 1.0856 § 0.3947 § 1.1326 § -0.3717 
ZInv 
§ -0.8293 § -9.2942 § 0.7434 § 3.4698 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 
§ -56.4834* § 15.9526* § 3.8212* § 4.2798* ZInv 
Inv 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level based on two tailed 
tests; § denotes Not Applicable § denotes Not Applicable. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Table 3. 
Evidence in Table 6 suggests that the demand for investments has been elastic to coupled 
subsidies in DEU and the UK while inelastic in FR and IT, irrespective of the asset class 
considered. The evolution of the regime-specific elasticity in FR reflects a move towards a 
more elastic demand for FB investment in the combined Dis ZInv regime while the rigidity of 
FB investment in the Inv regime has largely remained unchanged, if very large values of 
elasticity are ignored.2 Somewhat similar to the behaviour of FB investment, and despite the 
significant fluctuations it is subject to, the elasticity of ME investment in FR has increased in 
each of the three regimes. The evolution, over time, of the elasticity of investment demand in 
IT appears to be remarkably similar across asset classes, for the same regime considered. The 
Dis one seems to feature an increasingly more elastic investment demand while the combined 
ZInv Inv one appears to be characterised by fluctuations which compensate themselves, 
yielding a largely stable, and smaller than one in absolute value, elasticity. The demand for 
FB investments in DEU is clearly elastic to a change in coupled subsidies, yet its dynamics is 
somewhat hard to evaluate since a few instances of large elasticity values occur. If large 
elasticity values were ignored, the elasticity of FB investment to changes in coupled subsidies, 
in the ZInv and Inv regimes, have moved in opposite directions: the former has declined, in 
absolute value, while the latter has increased. Aside for the elasticity of ME investment in the 
Inv regime suggesting the evolution towards a more rigid demand for ME investment, those 
for the other two regimes highlight an opposite evolution towards more elastic demands. 
While characterised by elastic demands for both FB and ME in every regime, the UK appears 
to have experienced a decline in the elasticity values for FB in the combined ZInv Inv regime. 
Neglecting the 2001 value of FB elasticity, its dynamics – in the Dis regime – poses for the 
associated investment demand becoming more elastic. 
                                                        
2 While we are aware that elasticities larger than, say, 20 might induce significant concerns, we cannot 
avoid large values of subsidies and/or small values of investment to yield elasticites like the ones 
above. 
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In Table 7 we present the elasticity calculations for the 2005-2008 period, in the countries 
and for the asset classes of interest. The main differences with the previous Table concern the 
possibility of calculating the elasticities of interest also for HUN, since it joined the EU in 
2005. Moreover, while for the other countries the two time spans imply that only one CAP 
regime is in place, in HUN both coupled and decoupled support were in place, such that – in 
every year – two sets of elasticities can be calculated. In what follows, the commentary will 
distinguish between coupled and decoupled elasticities only for HUN; in any other case 
comments should be intended to describe the relationship between investment and 
decoupled subsidies. In line with the previous case, significance of the relevant ߚ coefficient 
drives the significance of the related calculated elasticity. 
One of the peculiar pieces of evidence in Table 7 is the occurrence of almost zero elastic 
investment demand functions. Aside for the one calculated for the ZInv regime of ME 
investment in FR, the 2005 elasticities to decoupled subsidies are very close to zero, across 
the identified regimes and irrespectively of the concerned asset class. Since this result arises 
for the first year of implementation of decoupled support, we might speculate that farms in 
FR were not prepared to the switch in the nature of the subsidies, such that they did not 
condition their choices to this variable. A somewhat similar evidence, although it occurs 
consistently for the whole 2005 – 2008 period, affects the zero-threshold model for ME 
investment in IT. FB and ME investment in FR appear largely inelastic, except for the ZInv 
regime in ME. While the dynamics of the elasticity for the Inv regime of FB investment in FR 
is monotonically increasing towards 1, all the other regimes for the two types of investments 
experience the same change between beginning and end of the period but record also 
fluctuations in the opposite direction in the intervening years. IT features inelastic 
investment demand functions for FB across all the estimated regimes which, over time, 
become more inelastic, except for the one for the Inv regime in FB investment whose 
elasticity increases for the two central years before resulting slightly lower than the 2005 one. 
In the UK, investment demands appear to be largely unstable in their elasticity values, 
fluctuating between elastic and inelastic relationships with decoupled subsidies. The only 
clear trend emerging relates to a move towards a less elastic demand in the zero threshold 
model for ME. Beginning and end of the period elasticites for the Dis and the combined ZInv 
Inv regimes for FB investment in the UK denote the transformation of elastic demand into an 
inelastic one, and vice-versa, for the two regimes, respectively. On the contrary, FB and ME 
investment demands in DEU appear to be largely elastic, across all the identified regimes. 
Concerning FB investment, the elasticity values denote a decline of the parameters’ values, 
denoting an increasing rigidity of the related investment demands with the one for FB in the 
Dis regime declining monotonically. ME investment demand in the Dis and ZInv regimes 
become, subject to somewhat unusually large values, more and less elastic, respectively, 
between the beginning and the end of the period of interest. Excluding a really large value for 
2008, the variation over time of the elasticity of ME in the Inv regime in DEU presents a 
monotonic decline towards values implying an iso-elastic behaviour of the related demand 
functions. FB investment in HUN seems characterised by a dependence from coupled 
subsidies which fluctuates over the years maintaining the inelastic behaviour of FB 
investment in the Dis and Inv regimes with the value of elasticity declining over time. On the 
contrary, the elasticity of FB demand in the ZInv regime becomes bigger to exceed one, in 
absolute value. The decline in the elasticity values, over the period, is also a feature of the 
elasticity of ME investment to coupled subsidies across all the estimated regimes. The FB 
demand, across all the estimated regimes, is elastic to coupled subsidies, instead. ME 
investment demand becomes elastic only since 2007 in the ZInv and in 2008 in the Inv 
regimes while it actually monotonically becomes more rigid in the Dis regime. 
5.3 Simulated percentage changes in investment levels under CAP policy 
reform scenarios and comparative static analyses 
Table 8 presents the percentage change in investment obtained applying (2) when the policy 
shocks are those in the four columns in Table 1 
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Table 8. Simulated changes in average net investment levels due to proposed CAP policy reform scenarios 
   
Sign of 
ࢼࢊ 
ࣈ૛૙૙ૡ,࢐
ࢊ  ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത ∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത (1) Dir. effect ∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത (2) Dir. effect 
∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത 
(3) 
Dir. effect 
∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത 
(4) 
Dir. effect 
FR 
FB 
Dis 
+ -32.3828* -3.9044 550.51 - 388.59 - 420.98 - 64.77 - 
ZInv 
Inv + -0.7822* -129.1957 13.30 - 9.39 - 10.17 - 1.56 - 
ME 
Dis - 0.4684 -229.9723 -7.96 + -5.62 + -6.09 + -0.94 + 
ZInv - -2.0199 73.8329 34.34 + 24.24 + 26.26 + 4.04 + 
Inv - -0.5037 232.8085 8.56 + 6.04 + 6.55 + 1.01 + 
DEU 
FB 
Dis + 0.9286*** 3500.7560 -21.36 - -12.07 - -14.86 - -3.71 - 
ZInv + 6.6697*** 510.9320 -153.40 - -86.71 - -106.72 - -26.68 - 
Inv + 1.9740*** 1320.0380 -45.40 - -25.66 - -31.58 - -7.90 - 
ME 
Dis + -6.9760** -232.6132 160.45 - 90.69 - 111.62 - 27.90 - 
ZInv + 4.8517** 319.2914 -111.59 - -63.07 - -77.63 - -19.41 - 
Inv + -99.7007** -9.6516 2293.12 - 1296.11 - 1595.21 - 398.80 - 
HUN 
FB 
Dis + -3.9729*** -332.7315 39.73 - 27.81 - 31.78 - 0.00 § 
ZInv + -78.7439*** -33.5046 787.44 - 551.21 - 629.95 - 0.00 § 
Inv + 4.1002*** 470.7855 -41.00 - -28.70 - -32.80 - 0.00 § 
ME 
Dis + 0.5359 332.2688 -5.36 - -3.75 - -4.29 - 0.00 § 
ZInv + -1.7400 -202.1463 17.40 - 12.18 - 13.92 - 0.00 § 
Inv + -2.2612 -99.5305 22.61 - 15.83 - 18.09 - 0.00 § 
ITA 
FB 
Dis + -0.1385 -366.8578 5.12 - 1.39 - 3.05 - 0.83 - 
ZInv + -0.1873 -365.0720 6.93 - 1.87 - 4.12 - 1.12 - 
Inv + -0.1148 -550.8514 4.25 - 1.15 - 2.53 - 0.69 - 
ME 
Dis 
- 0.0389 -374.5699 -1.44 + -0.39 + -0.86 + -0.23 + ZInv 
Inv 
UK 
FB 
Dis + -0.3717 -327.1312 -2.23 + 3.72 - 1.86 - 0.74 - 
ZInv 
+ 3.4698 44.6537 20.82 + -34.70 - -17.35 - -6.94 - 
Inv 
ME 
Dis 
+ 4.2798* 428.3541 25.68 + -42.80 - -21.40 - -8.56 - ZInv 
Inv 
Note: ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത expressed in real Euros, (1) denotes the EU flat rate scenario of CAP reform, (2) denotes the Min 80% scenario of CAP reform, (3) denotes the Min 90% and objective 
criteria scenario of CAP reform, (4) denotes the Integration scenario of CAP reform; § denotes Not Applicable since no sign can be clearly associated to a zero percentage 
change variation. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Table 7 and equation (2). 
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To facilitate the interpretation of the results of this simulation exercise, we also present the 
ancillary columns for the sign of ߚௗ as well as values for the ߦଶ଴଴଼,௝
௦௨௕  and ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത. Except for the 
UK under the EU flat rate and the HUN under the integration DPs reform scenarios, all the 
remaining policy reform options are characterized by a percentage decline in the level of DPs. 
In turn, the resulting sign for the ∆ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത (#) is opposite the one of the calculated elasticity 
ߦଶ଴଴଼,௝
௦௨௕ . To define a qualitative effect of the impact of ∆ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത (#) on the regime-specific average 
investment level ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത, we arrange the column for the directional effect (Dir. effect) which aims 
to define whether ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത should decline or rise because of the policy change. A negative sign (-) 
of the Dir. effect in each regime, suggesting a worsening in the investment prospects of farms 
in a given regime, is the result of a positive percentage change in average net investment 
when the latter is negative (namely negative investment becoming even more negative) or of 
a negative percentage change in presence of positive average investment levels. A positive 
sign (+) of the Dir. effect in each regime, suggesting an improvement in the investment 
prospects of a farm in a given regime, is the result of a negative percentage change in average 
net investment when the latter is negative (namely negative investment becoming less 
negative) or of a positive percentage change in presence of positive average investment levels. 
Note that no sign is associated to the zero percentage change in net investment levels 
expected in HUN if the Integration scenario were implemented. 
The switch in the Dir. effect for investment in both asset classes in the UK, from (+) to (-),is 
essentially due to the UK expecting an increase in DPs under the EU flat rate policy reform 
scenario. Every other country appears to be subject to consistent Dir. effects across the 
reform scenarios. The generalised reduction in support levels induced by the scenarios in 
Table 1, leads to the expectation that the prospects for average net investment levels will 
worsen across countries and asset classes. This expectation is met in all cases except for ME 
in both FR and IT, under all policy scenarios. While unexpected, this result is worthy of some 
confidence since it is consistent across reform scenarios which all imply a percentage 
reduction in DPs. 
6. Conclusions 
The present Deliverable completes the analysis, initiated in Deliverable 5.2, of the investment 
behaviour, in farm buildings and machinery and equipment, of a sample of specialised arable 
crop farms as a function of endowments (i.e., the stock of capital at the beginning of the 
period), market conditions (i.e., cost of capital, output and input prices) and existing public 
support schemes (i.e., coupled and/or decoupled CAP provisions). 
It does so better describing the nature and relevance of the different investment behaviours 
based on the number of statistically significant estimated threshold values (see Deliverable 
5.2) and the number of farms belonging to each regime, respectively. Moreover, it describes 
the quantitative dependence of regime-dependent farm agricultural investment levels on the 
level of CAP payments calculating the respective elasticities. Lastly, since CAP payments are 
subject to a number of reform proposals, this deliverable calculates the comparative static 
percentage changes in average net investment levels associated to the currently debated set of 
policy options. 
The quantitative evidence provided suggests that under coupled support the number of farms 
falling every year in the identified regimes appears more stable than what happens when 
decoupled support is in place, especially when the counts for 2008 are compared to those for 
2005. Moreover, investment in both asset classes and every detected regime appears clearly 
elastic, and statistically significantly so, to both coupled and decoupled subsidies in Germany. 
On the contrary, the same relationships are inelastic in Italy, although only statistically 
significantly so for farm building investment under coupled CAP payments. In France, both 
farm building and machinery and equipment regime-dependent investment quantities react 
inelastically to coupled payments while dependence is inconclusive under decoupled support. 
It is interesting to note that regime-dependent investment decisions in both assets in 2005 
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appear largely zero elastic to decoupled payments. The evidence for Hungary suggests a 
largely mixed relationship between both types of investment and coupled payments while a 
largely elastic – and statistically significant – one with decoupled payments for the sole farm 
buildings. While the United Kingdom displays elastic relationships of both types of 
investments with coupled subsidies, with the one for farm buildings being also statistically 
significant at conventional levels, this result holds certain only for investment in machinery 
and equipment under decoupled support. Note that the latter result is statistically significant 
only at the 10% level. On the contrary, mixed evidence emerges for investment in farm 
buildings in presence of DPs. 
The analysis of the expected changes in the regime-dependent investment levels due to the 
implementation of some debated CAP reform scenarios, of Pillar I payments reveals that only 
few pieces of evidence contrast the anticipated reduction in investment levels following a cut 
in support. In fact, investment in machinery and equipment in France and Italy appears to 
respond positively to the widespread reduction in support levels induced by the policy 
scenarios considered. The other instance of positive reaction of investment levels to the 
reform scenario occurs for the United Kingdom which, under the EU flat rate implementation 
of the reform of Pillar I payments, is actually expected to receive higher payments. 
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